The Justice Department has filed comments opposing network neutrality with FCC. See http://www.freepress.net/docs/doj225767.pdf. These comments do not respond to a formal request for comments as had occurred previously,
see http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-31A1.pdf.
Instead they are unsolicited ex parte comments which raises questions why the Justice Department saw the need to weigh just now.
The comments are incredibly simplistic and offer further proof of how sponsored research and questionable statistics become the basis for policy, regulations and law. In a nutshell the Justice Department buys the laissez faire view that the marketplace can resolve all potential problems and no real problem has arisen.
The Justice Department can make its case only by ignoring unsponsored research, that point to real potential for problems, statistical compilations that show the broadband marketplace in the U.S. as comparatively inferior to best practices both in terms of price and quality, and the practical consequence of a cable/telco duopoly in Internet access.
By the Justice Departments reasoning it should follow that because of deregulation and commensurate marketplace competition in the wheeling of electricity and packets there could be no potential market manipulation by any single player or group in either industry. We know that in the electricity marketplace Enron traders managed to create bottlenecks, run up the spot market price and generate false congestion.
I am willing to speculate that Enron-type tactics can occur in the wheeling of packets. The fact that a Title II regulated common carrier, telephone company (Madison River Communications, LLC) could not get away with absolute blocking of packets—without detection and punishment—says nothing about the ability of unregulated or lightly regulated Title I information service providers to engage in harmful and unlawful bit discrimination.
I have stood midway in the debate on network neutrality and have identified plenty of instances where price and QOS discrimination make economic sense and do not violate applicable laws. See http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=893649;
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962181. But I cannot buy the Justice Department’s preoccupation with the virtue of discrimination, having absolutely no regard for the real potential for undetected or unremediable discrimination.
I hate to think—as others have—that “the fix is in” and this nation’s Justice Department files paper on behalf of specific stakeholders such as AT&T. But as the Network Neutrality debate plays out I increasingly believe that “Bellhead” investment recovery, pricing and billing mindsets will reshape the Internet to become a hybrid of the Public Switched Telephone Network, an outcome I predicted in 2001; see http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=29012.
see http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-31A1.pdf.
Instead they are unsolicited ex parte comments which raises questions why the Justice Department saw the need to weigh just now.
The comments are incredibly simplistic and offer further proof of how sponsored research and questionable statistics become the basis for policy, regulations and law. In a nutshell the Justice Department buys the laissez faire view that the marketplace can resolve all potential problems and no real problem has arisen.
The Justice Department can make its case only by ignoring unsponsored research, that point to real potential for problems, statistical compilations that show the broadband marketplace in the U.S. as comparatively inferior to best practices both in terms of price and quality, and the practical consequence of a cable/telco duopoly in Internet access.
By the Justice Departments reasoning it should follow that because of deregulation and commensurate marketplace competition in the wheeling of electricity and packets there could be no potential market manipulation by any single player or group in either industry. We know that in the electricity marketplace Enron traders managed to create bottlenecks, run up the spot market price and generate false congestion.
I am willing to speculate that Enron-type tactics can occur in the wheeling of packets. The fact that a Title II regulated common carrier, telephone company (Madison River Communications, LLC) could not get away with absolute blocking of packets—without detection and punishment—says nothing about the ability of unregulated or lightly regulated Title I information service providers to engage in harmful and unlawful bit discrimination.
I have stood midway in the debate on network neutrality and have identified plenty of instances where price and QOS discrimination make economic sense and do not violate applicable laws. See http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=893649;
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962181. But I cannot buy the Justice Department’s preoccupation with the virtue of discrimination, having absolutely no regard for the real potential for undetected or unremediable discrimination.
I hate to think—as others have—that “the fix is in” and this nation’s Justice Department files paper on behalf of specific stakeholders such as AT&T. But as the Network Neutrality debate plays out I increasingly believe that “Bellhead” investment recovery, pricing and billing mindsets will reshape the Internet to become a hybrid of the Public Switched Telephone Network, an outcome I predicted in 2001; see http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=29012.