Despite the
remarkably large amount of coverage and analysis of the network neutrality
debate, not everyone appreciates the wants, needs and desires of the major
stakeholders. Let’s step back and
consider their motivations and incentives of the three primary stakeholders:
consumers, retail ISPs and upstream carriers and sources of content.
Consumers
Consumers expect their monthly
broadband subscription payments to guarantee a predictable level of service in
terms of bit transmission speed and amount of downloadable (and uploadable) content
allowed per month. This expectation is
not contingent on their service provider’s ability to demand and receive
surcharge payments from upstream carriers and content providers.
When common
carrier phone companies provided dial up Internet access, consumers typically paid
for unmetered service. With the
conversion to broadband, service terms increasingly have bitrate delivery
commitments and generous, but metered caps on data downloading. Retail ISPs complained about having to
increase bandwidth without sharing in the windfall generated by their carriage
of increasingly valuable and plentiful content.
Nevertheless these carriers upgraded their networks with only minor rate
increases and without major episodes of congestion.
Now
consumers face rate increases, tiering of bit transmission speeds and efforts
by their ISPs to make reliable service contingent on surcharge payments and/or
bit prioritization offers. Consumers now
confront the prospect of greater cost of service and increased risk of degraded
service, particularly for bandwidth intensive service like Netflix. Consumers are not happy about this and may become
more vocal advocates for network neutrality simply on grounds that the status quo
of best efforts routing used to work fine, until ISPs got greedy.
But aren’t some
consumers becoming greedy themselves?
With the onset of full motion video services like Netflix and YouTube, Internet
demand increases significantly.
Consumers want a medium capable of handling “mission critical” video
bits representing “must see” television.
Real congestion can occur, not because retail ISPs play games with how
many ports and bandwidth they allocate for Netflix traffic, but perhaps
primarily because Netflix releases an entire season of must see programming and
bandwidth hogs gorge themselves with possibly hundreds of gigabytes.
Consumers
want their Netflix video streams to arrive on time and seamless at the same
time as they long for the kinder, gentler and less bandwidth intensive days
when best efforts routing always worked fine.
Retail ISPs
Retail ISPs provide the
essential last mile delivery of content to relatively captive eyeballs. While retail broadband subscribers can choose
between various wireline and wireless providers, one and only one carrier
typically provides all carriage.
Churning from one carrier to another can occur, but not without some
consumer inconvenience and motivation.
Having
regularly upgraded their networks and enhanced the value proposition of service,
retail ISPs predictably seek to recoup this sizeable investment and earn a generous
return. They have evidenced a growing
interest in increasing revenues and profits not just by raising retail
subscription rates, but also by demanding new or increased compensation from
upstream carriers and even content providers directly.
Retail ISPs
like to frame their compensation rights in terms of a two-sided market: 1)
downstream to end users paying monthly broadband subscriptions and 2) upstream
to other carriers who either barter transmission capacity through peering
agreements, or pay transiting fees when downstream and upstream traffic is not
equal.
Retail ISPs
do not have a legal or guaranteed right to a double source of revenue. In a possibly analogous situation, cable
television operators benefit from some instances of a double-sided market, but
not always. Cable operators combine end
user subscriptions with a share of the premium subscriptions paid for access to
premium content such as HBO. But cable
operators also pay upstream sources
of content, e.g., in copyright fees for the privilege of delivering content to
subscribers.
Arguably
retail ISP subscription rates should cover both the network cost of content
delivery plus at least some of the value represented by the upstream content
the Internet cloud access subscription provides. In this scenario, retail ISPs do not operate
like a credit card company that can capture payments from both credit card
users and vendors, but instead have to rely solely on subscriptions and
advertising.
Of course
retail ISPs do not see any need to compensate content providers for the value
of what broadband subscribers seek.
Retail ISPs do not share in the advertising revenues flowing to upstream
content providers and readily embrace a telephone company view that terminating
carriers deserve payments from upstream carriers or content sources,
particularly when traffic balances become disproportionately one sided.
Retail ISPs
cannot press the telephone service model too far, because of the concept of “cost
causation” favors upstream payments. Arguably
ISPs and their subscribers trigger the cost of content carriage: a demand pull,
instead of supply push rationale.
Content Providers
Content
providers want downstream carriers to deliver increasingly robust volumes of
content using the existing interconnection and compensation models that primarily
rely on end user subscription payments.
When facing pushback primary content sources note that consumers agree
to pay fees that have generated triple digit rates of return for carriers. Alternatively content sources design ways to
distribute their product at possibly lower costs by co-locating equipment on
ISP premises. In what they would
consider the worst case scenario, content providers agree to new, more generous
compensation agreements with retail ISPs as occurred in the Netflix-Comcast
paid peering arrangement.
Content
providers do not share their subscription fees with downstream carriers, as HBO
does. On the other hand, retail
broadband subscribers expect their Internet cloud access to include access to
any source of content without regard to how much of the total bandwidth any
single source requires. Certainly the
Netflix business model assumes low and unmetered broadband delivery charges
ironically not like the physical delivery of disks model that has both higher total
costs and is metered.
The FCC’s Dilemma
The FCC faces
an extraordinary quandary in trying to forge a compromises that satisfices
these three constituencies. No one can
achieve total satisfaction here. Consumers will have to pay more for broadband. Retail ISPs will not have unlimited
opportunities to raise rates, particularly for content sources that can get by
without prioritization of traffic absent deliberate strategies by retail ISPs to
degrade basic service. Content providers—particularly
the major causes for ever increasing bandwidth demand—will have to pay more as
well.
The FCC has
to forge a compromise where consumers can secure “better than best efforts”
delivery of video at a price, but without making it possible for retail ISPs to
demand a surcharge from every source of content. I continue to believe that the FCC does not
have to reclassify broadband access to achieve this compromise.
In large
part marketplace negotiations can resolve the most pressing problems. However network neutrality advocates make a
convincing argument that non-charities like Comcast will have little
self-restraint in their quest for new profit centers. The FCC has to stand ready to discipline and
sanction ISPs when they resort to strategies and tactics that degrade service as
a nudge or a push to force the payment of unnecessary surcharges.