What makes this matter so difficult is that while an appellate court might try to consider the issue narrowly in terms of whether sufficient statutory authority exists, broader business and political factors matter as well.  Recall that the FCC was able to justify substantial deregulation of DSL, replacing Title II with Title I oversight, based on changed circumstances, largely concerns about "regulatory parity" with largely unregulated cable modem service.  In this politicized and super-charged environment, coupled with the Comcast court decision, the FCC cannot readily reassert Title II based on changed circumstances supporting light-handed government oversight and the public interest, e.g., evidence that Internet access has become an essential public need coupled with proof of discriminatory conduct.
       

There is much speculation that Chairman Genachowski has abandoned his Third Way link to streamlined Title II authority, replacing it with Title I ancillary jurisdiction based on language contained in Sec. 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  This section requires the FCC and states to encourage ubiquitous access to "advanced telecommunications capability."  The Commission probably will face judicial skepticism whether and how Sec. 706 confers statutory authority to encourage Internet access through selective regulation.
       

I can appreciate that Chairman Genachowski would want to apply a streamlined version of Title II.  It provides the direct statutory authority a reviewing court requires and before changed circumstances provided the basis for its abandonment, Title II required nondiscrimination, transparency and the other Internet Freedoms.  But the political impracticality of re-regulation and the Supreme Court's Brand X affirming the FCC's functional abandonment of Title II, by classifying cable modem Internet access as an information service, makes reliance on Title II a sure loser on appeal.
       

Chairman Genachowski appears to have acknowledged this, but returning to Title I ancillary jurisdiction.  There is case precedent for judicial deference to the FCC's expertise to fashion public interest serving remedies under Title I, e.g., the Commission imposition of cable television regulations in advance of having received explicit statutory authority.  But as emphasized by the D.C. Circuit in the Comcast case, the link to some sort of statutory authority must exist.  The D.C. Circuit likely will remain quite skeptical about an FCC claim of ancillary jurisdiction, simply because Title I confers some general oversight duty over "wire and radio" communications, or the advanced telecommunications capability promotion elements of Section 706.
       

From my vantage point, it looks like the Commission loses either way, should some aggrieved party appeal.  Since Congress has a near zero likelihood of passing explicit statutory authority, the status quo remains.  This means that companies, such as Comcast, which can't help but push the envelope, will exploit the absence of rules to its financial advantage.  The demand for video carriage surcharge from Level 3, provides an example how an ISP can raise the cost of doing business of a rival.  Expect Comcast and others to raise the cost of doing business for both content delivery networks, which generate traffic for Comcast to deliver, as well as content producers, like Netflix, that compete with Comcast's video products.